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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF U'TAH 
GUINN RASBURY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.- Case No. 9836 
MARVIN L. BAJNUM, 
Defendant a;n,d Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
By his first cause of action plaintiff, hereinafter 
referred to as respondent, sued defendant, hereinafter 
referred to as appellant, for the amount due and owing 
on a promissory note executed by appellant in favor of 
respondent in the amount of $3,838.70. Respondent's 
second cause of action was for the amount of $1,300.00 
for accounting services rendered by respondent to appel-
lant. Appellant defendant this action by filing a counter-
claim wherein he alleged that respondent had agreed to 
manage the Tanglewilde Key Club, the country club busi-
ness owned by appellant, and that respondent should 
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2 
account to appellant for the alleged management of said 
business (R. 12, 13). 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court dismissed respondent's first cause of 
action and appellant's counterclaim and awarded re--
spondent judgment on respondent's second cause of 
action. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to reverse the trial court's judgment 
on respondent's second cause of action and for judgment 
on his counterclaim for $4,300.00 and an order remand-
ing the case to the lower court for an accounting by 
respondent. 
Respondent, by way of cross appBal, asks for a re-
versal of the trial court's order dismissing respondent's 
first cause of action and to have the same remanded to 
the trial court for entry of jugment thereon. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The contradictions in the record were resolved by 
the trial court in favor of respondent. A restatement of 
the facts is required in support of the findings of the 
court below. 
During the year 1958 appellant operated two social 
clubs in Houston, Texas, known as the Club Silver Key, 
Inc., a corporation, which was dissolved on ~Iay 31, 1958, 
and the Tanglewilde Key Club, a sole proprietorship, 
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which was foreclosed November 1, 1958. Respondent is 
an .accountant in Houston, Texas, and as such was re-
quested by appellant in the Spring of 1959 to prepare 
income tax returns covering the years 1957 .and 1958 for 
the Club Silver Key, Inc. and for the appellant, Marvin 
L. Bainum, and his wife (Tr.111). 
In the month of July 1958, prior to appellant's re-
quest to prepare the aforementioned returns, respondent 
gave appellant $3,639.77 in exchange for appellant's 
promissory note in the sum of $3,838.70 (R. 3, Ex. 3). 
To secure the payment of the note certain accounts re-
ceivable of Tanglewilde Key Club were assigned to re-
spondent (Ex. 1). Respondent had no control over the 
collection of these .accounts and, as a result, the monies, 
if any, that were collected were used for the Club's cur-
rent operations ( Tr. 96, 97, 98, 99). After the Tangle-
wilde Key Club closed its doors the latter part of Octo-
ber 1958, respondent, at the direction of appellant, col-
lected some unassigned receivables in the amount of 
approximately $978.58 and applied $709.10 of said 
amount on the balance appellant owed on a note to one 
Ed Loraine, upon which respondent was an accommoda-
tion endorser, and the remainder of the amount collect-
ed, $169.48, was applied on the note in favor of respond-
ent, leaving owing upon it $3,669.92 (Tr. 62, 106, 107, 
108,"110, Ex. 4). 
In the Spring.of 1959 when respondent was request-
ed by appellant to prepare the income tax returns for 
Club Silver Key, Inc. and the individual returns for Mar-
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vin L. Bainum and his wife, and after the monies had 
been collected and appied on the notes, appel-
lant told respondent that he had done a good job with 
respect to the collections and acknowledged that he only 
had respondent's note left to pay (Tr. 109, 110, Ex. 4). 
Respondent did not manage, operate or liquidate the 
country club business owned by appellant nor agree to do 
any of these things; he acted solely as an accountant 
for appellant and attempted, at appellant's direction and 
with appellant's full knowledge and approval, to collect 
money which was owing to him and Ed Loraine on notes 
given by appellant to respondent and Ed Loraine (Tr. 
48, 50, 75, R. 29). 
The pretrial order entered by Judge Ellett on Oc-
tober 31, 1962, provided that: 
"Plaintiff is ordered to furnish defendant 
all books and records of the defendant now in the 
possession of the plaintiff, and unless he does so 
at least ten days prior to the date of trial, the 
plaintiff will be denied the: right to· use any of 
these books .and records in connection with estab-
lishing his case or any defense thereto." (R. 19, 
20) (Emphasis added) 
At least ten days prior to trial appellant was fur-
nished the records and exhibits relied upon by respondent 
and which were received in evidence, with the exception 
of Exhibit 7 which was admitted in evidence by stipula-
tion of counsel (Tr. 124). In addition, the records which 
were furnished consisted of documents properly to be 
considered respondent's property ( Tr. 89, 105). 
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Appellant admitted the execution of the note and 
offered no evidence of payment of same (R. 12). In 
addition, appellant does not deny that respondent ren-
dered an accounting service for appellant, nor does he 
deny that the sum of $1,300.00 is reasonable (Tr. 145, 
152). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THERE IS COMP,ETENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS WITH RESPECT TO RE-
SPONDENT'S SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION. 
The evidence affirmatively discloses, and appellant 
does not seem to dispute, the services rendered by re-
spondent as alleged in his second cause of action. There 
was no dispute as to the reasonable value of the services 
so rendered except by the .attempt at offset through 
the medium of appellant's counterclaim. The judgment 
in favor of respondent on his second cause of action 
should be affirmed, the factual matters being peculiarly 
within the prerogative of the trial court. Lake v. Pin.der 
(1962), 13 Utah 2d 76,368 P.2d 593. 
POINT. II. 
THE DISMISSAL OF APPELLANT'S COUNTERCLAIM 
AND THE JUDGMENT BASED THEREON SHOULD NOT 
BE DIS'TURBED ON APPEAL. 
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Appellant's counterclaim, which the trial court dis-
missed, was premised upon the contention that respond-
ent was entrusted with the business of the Tanglewilde 
Key Club and, being so charged, wrongfully converted 
to his own use the money and property of appellant in 
the latter's proprietorship of said club and business 
(Pretrial Order, R. 19-20). 
Appellant admitted that the income tax returns filed 
in September 1959 for Club Silver Key, Inc., and the in-
dividual income tax. returns for Marvin L. Bainum and 
his wife for the years 1957 and 1958 respectively, were 
completed in every way and that they were signed by 
him and his wife (Tr. 145, 152). Just above the signature 
line of the individual income tax return for 1958, which 
appellant Bainum admits signing, is the following lan-
guage: 
"I declare under the penalties or perjury 
that this return (including any accompanying 
schedules and statements) has been examined by 
me and to the best of my knowledge and belief is 
a true, correct and complete return." 
Appellant's signature on the inc01ne tax return 1s an 
admission by him that he knew full well the matters and 
things pertaining to his business and is incompatible 
with his claim that he had never received an accounting. 
For example, the tax return shows that the Tanglewilde 
Key Club was foreclosed November 1, 1958, and that it 
suffered a loss of $4,100.24 by virtue of the sale of the 
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club house, equipment, furniture, land etc. It also shows 
the amount received by the Tanglewilde Key Club for 
the year 1958, the cost of goods sold, the gross profit 
of the business, business expenses and a net profit for 
the year of $27 4.36. 
The fact that appellant requested respondent in the 
Spring of 1959 to prepare his income tax returns, and 
the fact that the returns were not filed until September 
1959 after numerous extensions were granted, show a 
continuing relationship between these individuals after 
the closure of the Tanglewilde Key Club (Ex. 7). The 
relationship would not have been a continuing one if 
what appellant alleged were true, that he had repeatedly 
requested an accounting from respondent for his alleged 
management of appellant's business. It is submitted that 
the only demand that was ever made with respect to an 
accounting took place after respondent filed this lawsuit 
and is a familiar defense to suits of this kind. 
The admission by Marvin L. Bainum and Nadine 
Bainum that they were familiar with the information up-
on which the tax return was based, and the evidence re-
specting the continuing relationship of these parties 
after November 1958, puts appellant's counterclaim In 
the position relegated it by the trial court. 
From the foregoing the trial court rightfully con-
cluded that the counterclaim should be dismissed (R. 
30), finding in that regard the following: 
"1. That plaintiff was the personal accountant 
for defendant during the years 1958 a~d 1959. 
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2. That plaintiff acted solely as an accountant 
for defendant and did not agree with de-
fendant to take o:ver, operate or liquidate the 
Country Club business owned by defendant. 
3. That plaintiff has not converted to his own 
use any money or property belonging to de-
fendant. 
4. That defendant has failed to prove facts in 
support of the allegations set forth in the 
counterclaim not herein specifically mention-
ed." (R. 29) 
POINT III. 
RESPONDENT, NOT HAVING VIOLATED THE 
PRETRIAL ORDER AND THERE BEING NO EVIDENCE 
OF PAYMENT OF THE NOTE, IS ENTITLED TO JUDG-
MENT ON HIS FIRST OAUSE OF .A:CTION. 
The trial court found "that plaintiff has failed to 
furnish the booiks and records of defendant as pro-
vided in the pretrial order herein and by reason thereof 
plaintiff has failed in his proof with respect to his first 
cause of action." (R. 28) The pretrial order stated: 
"The plaintiff is ordered to furnish the de-
fendant all books and records of the defendant 
now in the possession of the plaintiff, and unless 
he does so .at least ten days prior to the date of 
trial, the plaintiff will be denied the right to use 
any of these books and records in corvnection with 
est,ablishing his case or any defen.se thereto." 
(R. 19, 20) (Emphasis added) 
After reviewing the evidence which was offered at 
the trial, it can be seen that respondent did not violate 
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the pretrial order. The execution of the promissory note, 
a copy of which was attached to the complaint, was ad-
mitted by appellant. The accounts receivable which were 
assigned to respondent, Exhibit 1, were admitted in evi-
dence at the pretrial hearing. The seven cancelled checks 
evidencing the consideration for the note, Exhibit 3, were 
personal records of respondent Guinn Rasbury. Re-
spondent's Exhibit 4, showing the application of the 
payments on the note, was likewise respondent's per-
sonal record ( Tr. 105). The income tax returns for 1957 
and 1958 for Club Silver Key, Inc. and the individual 
returns for Marvin Bainum and his wife, Exhibit 5, were 
respondent's copies of the returns; appellant had in his 
possession his own copies of same prior to the trial ( Tr. 
144). A copy of respondent's Exhibit 6 was furnished 
appellant in October 1961 as part of respondent's an-
swers to interrogatories. A letter dated August 5, 1959, 
to respondent Rasbury from appellant, a notice address-
ed to Marvin L. Bainum respecting the filing of income 
tax returns and a copy of a letter to appellant from re-
spondent Rasbury, Exhibit 7, were admitted in evidence 
through stipulation of counsel ( Tr. 151). In addition, 
respondent's Exhibits 3, 4, and 5 were given to appel-
lant's counsel ten days prior to the date of trial. 
From the foregoing it is clear that respondent was 
not in violation of the pretrial order; appellant was ad-
vised beforehand of the items of proof upon which re-
spondent would rely and respondent did not attempt to 
establish his case or defend it by use of the books and 
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records of the Tanglewilde Key Club. The erroneous in-
terpretation of the pretrial order by the trial court con-
stituted error and was detrimental to the respondent. 
The admission by appellant of the note established 
a prima facie case in favor of respondent's first cause of 
action and the burden of proof to show payment was on 
appellant (Tr. 114). 
"As a matter of pleading it is necessary for 
the plaintiff in an action on a bill or note to al-
lege the nonpayment thereof, but it is not neces-
sary for him to support such allegations by any 
proof other than that which is necessarily attend-
ant on the introduction of the note in evidence or 
its proof in case the note or bill has been lost or 
destroyed; the rule is elementary that the defend-
ant in an action on a promissory note who asserts 
that it has been paid in part or in full, has the 
burden of proving such payment." 8 Am. Jur., 
Section 1035, page 518. 
Appellant's attempt at offset failed when his counter-
claim was rejected by the trial court (R. 23, 24, 25, 27, 
28, 29 and 30), and the prima facie case made out by 
respondent remained, entitling him to judgment on his 
first cause of action. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant attempts in his brief to divert attention 
from the real issues of this case to the mystery of the lost 
books and reeords of the Tanglewilde Key Club and seeks 
to interject the further irrelevant question of the corpo-
rate records of Club Silver Key, Inc., which was dis-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
solved May 31, 1958, prior to the execution of the note 
in question and any of the issues raised by the pleadings 
in this action. What happened to the books and records 
of the Tanglewilde Key Club may remain a matter of 
conjecture since even appellant B.ainum did not deny hav-
ing a key to the office where the books were kept (Tr. 
120). The mystery nevertheless is made moot by the pre-
trial order and the individual income tax return for 
1958, which appellant admitted signing. 
The evidence is sufficient to support the findings of 
fact adopted by the trial court in its dismissal of appel-
lant's counterclaim. With the dismissal of appeHant's 
counterclaim, appellant's defense to respondent's first 
cause of action failed, thus entitling respondent to re-
cover in accordance with the prayer 'of his complaint. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FRANK J. GUSTIN 
GUSTIN, RICHARDS & 
MATTSSON 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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